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Abstract  
Paul Feyerabend argued that theories can be faced with experimental anomalies whose 
refuting character can only be recognized by developing alternatives to the theory. The 
alternate theory must explain the experimental results without contrivance and it must 
also be supported by independent evidence. I show that the situation described by Feyer-
abend arises again and again in experiments or observations that test the postulates in the 
standard cosmological model relating to dark matter. The alternate theory is Milgrom’s 
modified dynamics (MOND). I discuss three examples: the failure to detect dark-matter 
particles in laboratory experiments; the lack of evidence for dark-matter sub-haloes and 
the dwarf galaxies that are postulated to inhabit them; and the failure to confirm the pre-
dicted orbital decay of Milky Way satellite galaxies and other systems due to dynamical 
friction against the dark matter. In each case, Feyerabend’s criterion directs us to interpret 
the experimental or observational results as an indirect refutation of the standard cosmo-
logical model in favor of Milgrom’s theory.  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1 Introduction
An unresolved question of current interest to cosmologists and particle physicists is the 
nature of the dark matter that is believed to fill the universe. Laboratory experiments de-
signed to detect the dark particles have been underway since the 1980s but so far, no un-
ambiguous signal has been observed. This negative result is generally considered insuffi-
cient to refute the underlying theory, however, since that theory (the standard, or 𝚲CDM, 
cosmological model) does not specify the cross-section of interaction of the putative par-
ticles with normal matter, and the signal from an event might be too weak to stand out 
against the background, regardless of how sensitive or discriminating the detector. 
Paul Feyerabend proposed that situations similar to the one just described are com-
mon in science, and furthermore that they sometimes can be interpreted as effective refu-
tations of the underlying theory. What is required, he argued, is an alternate theory that 
explains the experimental result and that makes new, successful predictions. In one of the 
earliest formulations of his methodological rule, Feyerabend (1964a, p. 351-352) wrote: 
Consider a theory T … which entails that F. Assume that actually F' (where 
"F takes place" is inconsistent with "F' takes place"). Assume also that the 
laws of nature forbid the existence of equipment for distinguishing F and 
F'. The theory T is then obviously false; only we shall never be able to dis-
cover this by a consideration of "the facts" only.  
… 
Assume that, in addition to T, we introduce another theory T' … which cov-
ers the facts supporting T, makes successful additional predictions A, and 
entails that F'. The test of the additional predictions may be regarded as an 
indirect proof that F' and, thereby, as an indirect refutation of T. 
As applied to the dark-matter detection problem, Feyerabend’s T would be the standard 
cosmological model, F would be a statement something like “dark-matter particles are 
passing through my detector”, and F′ would be the negation of F. A viable alternate theo-
ry exists that entails this F′ and that (arguably) satisfies the other conditions that Feyer-
abend sets for T′: it is Milgrom’s (1983) modified Newtonian dynamics, or MOND, 
which indeed has made a number of “successful additional predictions.” Taken at face 
value, Feyerabend’s rule instructs us to treat the non-detection of dark particles as an (in-
direct) refutation of the standard cosmological model in favor of Milgrom’s theory, and 
hence as a falsification of the dark matter hypothesis. 
Feyerabend (1963; 1964a,b; 1965; 1970; 1978) was keen to draw some very general 
conclusions from his rule: about the nature of induction, the meaning of empirical con-
tent, the theory-ladenness of factual statements, the need for theoretical pluralism and so 
on. These generalizations have been criticized (and, less often, defended) by a number of 
authors. The criticisms (e.g. Worrall 1978, 1991; Laudan 1989; Preston 1997) are inter-
esting and important, but for the most part, they have not been directed against the use of 
Feyerabend’s criterion as a guide for choosing between theories.  
I will argue that, in the context of current cosmological theory, the situation that Fey-
erabend describes is quite common: it crops up again and again in observations or exper-
iments that test the postulates in the standard cosmological model relating to dark matter. 
In each of the three examples that I will discuss in detail, I will argue that Feyerabend’s 
criterion directs us to decide in favor of Milgrom’s theory and against the standard cos-
mological model. 
 
2 Feyerabend’s rule 
The two cosmological theories discussed here are characterized by strikingly different 
ontologies. The standard cosmological model assumes the existence of dark matter; Mil-
grom’s theory does not. The entity which standard-model cosmologists call `dark matter’ 
is what scientific realists (e.g. Boyd 1984) sometimes label a `theoretical term’ or `theo-
retical entity’: the particles that make it up have never been detected in the laboratory via 
methods that an experimental physicist would consider decisive, hence the existence of 
the particles remains conjectural. 
 A comprehensive discussion of the sucesses and failures of the two cosmological par-
adigms can be found in the excellent review articles by Famaey & McGaugh (2012) and 
McGaugh (2015) and in the recent monograph by Merritt (2020). These authors point out 
that the two theories come close to achieving what philosophers of science call `empirical 
equivalence’: that is: researchers in both camps can claim (with greater or lesser justifica-
tion) to successfully explain a large body of observational and experimental results.  In 1
the past, that claim could only be made with regard to data relating to galaxy-scale phe-
nomena. But following the successful relativistic generalization of Milgrom’s theory by 
Skordis & Złosnik (2020), the explanatory scope of Milgrom’s theory has been expanded 
to include the cosmic microwave background (CMB) temperature fluctuation spectrum, 
the matter power spectrum, gravitational lensing statistics etc. — precisely the data that 
 Of course there are data which constitute anomalies for both theories. Two examples: (i) the measured 1
abundances of lithium-7 and deuterium imply, via the equations of big bang nucleosynthesis, very differ-
ent numbers for the mean density of nuclei (`baryons’) in the universe. This anomaly is independent of 
assumptions about dark matter and exists with equal force in both theories. (ii) The observed dynamics of 
galaxy clusters is difficult to explain under either theory. Under the standard model, dark matter is in-
voked to explain the cluster data, but with limited success. Merritt (2020) also presents a list of anomalies 
that exist under the standard model but not under Milgrom’s theory (the `core-cusp’ problem, the `too big 
to fail’ problem, the `problem of the satellite planes’ etc.).
standard-model cosmologists (e.g. Dodelson 2011) have often insisted can only be ex-
plained by postulating dark matter.  2
But there is one sort of observational result that is usually ignored when tabulating the 
successes and failures of these two competing theories. Consider, for example, the fact 
that laboratory experiments have so far always failed to detect the dark particles. One 
might be tempted to argue: “The non-detection of dark-matter particles constitutes a suc-
cess of prediction for Milgrom’s theory, since that theory does not postulate the existence 
of dark particles, hence it predicts that none will be observed.” Such an argument is 
rarely, if ever, made. After all, Milgrom’s theory does not postulate the existence of uni-
corns, but one would hardly claim that a failure to observe unicorns constitutes evidence 
in favor of Milgrom’s theory. 
But Paul Feyerabend argued that negative experimental results like this can, if certain 
conditions are satisfied, be interpreted as effectively refuting one theory while providing 
a warrant for belief in another. 
Feyerabend (e.g. 1965, p. 176) motivated his proposed methodological rule using the 
example of Brownian motion. Already in the 19th century, French physicist Louis 
Georges Gouy had argued that the seemingly unending motion of pollen grains sub-
mersed in a fluid medium constituted a potential problem for the theory of phenomeno-
logical thermodynamics, but (Feyerabend argued) inconsistency with that theory was im-
possible to demonstrate experimentally, since doing so would have required precise mea-
surement of the particle’s kinetic energy and of the amount of heat transferred from the 
fluid. Whereas the kinetic/corpuscular theory of heat as developed by Einstein and 
Smoluchowski in the early 20th century was not only accommodating of Brownian mo-
tion but also entailed novel predictions about the long-time statistical nature of the mo-
tion, predictions that were subsequently confirmed by Jean Baptiste Perrin and others. Af-
ter these consequences of the kinetic theory had been developed and tested, Feyerabend 
argued, the earlier observations of Brownian motion could be (re-)interpreted as refuta-
tions of the phenomological theory. 
As a second example, Feyerabend (1969, 1981) discussed the discovery of “observer 
dependence” (in the sense of relativistic frame dependence). He noted that the Newtonian 
 Skordis & Złosnik were not the first to demonstrate empirical equivalence of this sort. At least two ear2 -
lier versions of Milgrom’s theory (Angus 2009; Bereshziani & Khoury 2015) successfully accounted for 
all large-scale cosmological data, but they did so by postulating forms of dark matter. Skordis & Złosnik 
were the first to achieve this without invoking any form of dark matter.
postulate of observer independence appeared to conflict with some “second-order effects 
of motion” in electrodynamics,  but that  3
it was assumed, for some time, that a solution could be found within the 
framework of classical physics; i.e. it was assumed that the difficulties were 
difficulties of the application of the classical point of view rather than of 
some basic assumptions of this point of view itself (Feyerabend 1969, p. 
52). 
Einstein’s special and general relativity theories were inconsistent with the idea of ob-
server independence and were adopted because of their empirical successes. But, Feyer-
abend argued, the failure of the classical point of view was “a consequence of the success 
of the new theory and could not have been demonstrated without this theory.” 
Feyerabend claimed that situations like these—in which there exist experimental re-
sults that suggest a theory refutation or anomaly, but where limitations in the experimen-
tal method, or uncertainties in the interpretation of the theory, make it essentially impos-
sible to establish the refutation—are common in science. He argued not only that an al-
ternate theory is needed to demonstrate the refutation, but that “a refutation that is based 
on a successful alternative is much stronger than is a refutation resulting from the direct 
comparison of theory and “facts” ” (Feyerabend 1965, p. 249). Because a potential anom-
aly can always be put aside, or dealt with by ad hoc theory adjustments, alternate theories 
are needed to force adherents of the original theory to accept the refuting character of the 
experimental result.  
But in what sense (if any) was it reasonable for Feyerabend to claim that success of 
the alternate theory constitutes a refutation—if only indirect, or effective—of the original 
theory? One interpretation (e.g. Laymon 1977) runs as follows: The fact that T′ success-
fully predicts novel phenomena A lends support to T′ ; and since T′ is inconsistent with T 
(T′ entails F′, T entails F, and F is inconsistent with F′ ), then, to the extent that  T′ is cor-
roborated by the occurrence of A, T is disfavored. The success of T′ in explaining A is 
thus seen as a reason for rejecting T. Stated differently: given two viable theories that are 
both consistent with an ambiguous experimental result, we should prefer the theory that is 
better corroborated through confirmed novel predictions. One might argue further that the 
`refutation’ is strengthened to the extent that the novel predictions of T′ are improbable or 
unexpected from the standpoint of T : that is: to the extent that A constitutes a severe test 
 Feyerabend does not state explicitly, in either of the cited articles, what he means by “second-order ef3 -
fects of motion”. I believe that “second-order” here means order V2/c2 where V is the speed of the ob-
server relative to the Ether and c is the speed of light. The famous Michelson and Morley experiments 
were of second-order in this sense. Cei (2020, Chapter 7) remarks that “by 1895 the genuinely troubling 
results [from the standpoint of Lorentz’s theory] were only the ones of second order.”
for T′ given the background knowledge represented by T (as in Popper 1959, chapter 10 
or 1983, chapter IV). 
This interpretation is reasonable enough, but it omits one element that Feyerabend of-
ten emphasized: that from the standpoint of the original theory T, the experimental result 
is anomalous; it appears, at least superficially, to require an explanation. For instance 
(italics his): 
The reason why a refutation through alternatives is stronger is easily seen. 
The direct case is “open,” in the sense that a different explanation of the 
apparent failure of the theory (of the inconsistency between the theory and 
certain singular statements) might seem to be possible. The presence of an 
alternative makes this attitude much more difficult, if not impossible, for 
we possess now not only the appearance of failure (viz., the inconsistency) 
but also an explanation, on the basis of a successful theory, of why failure 
actually occurred (Feyerabend 1965, pp. 249-250). 
In the Brownian motion example, for instance, the unending motion of the pollen grain, 
as interpreted from the standpoint of phenomenological thermodynamics, appeared to 
conflict with the conservation of energy, even though that conflict could not be demon-
strated through measurements; while the same observed motions did not present a prima 
facie problem for the kinetic/corpuscular theory. 
Laudan (1989), who was concerned primarily with Feyerabend’s broad claims about 
the meaning of `empirical content’, points out that there is no guarantee, in general, that 
theory T itself might not entail A; and if so it would be problematic to claim that confir-
mation of A can refute T. While this exact circumstance does not arise in any of the ex-
amples that I discuss in this paper, it is nevertheless true that adherents of the standard 
cosmological model (theory T in this case) will often claim to have explained (`accom-
modate’ would be a better word here), in a post-hoc sense, some confirmed Milgromian 
prediction (that is, some A). Typically such claims are based on large-scale computer 
simulations that incorporate a number of adjustable parameters describing sub-grid 
physics, initial conditions and so forth.  Worrall (1985, p. 313) argues that  
when one theory has accounted for a set of facts by parameter-adjustment, 
while a rival accounts for the same facts directly and without contrivance, 
then the rival does, but the first does not, derive support from those facts. 
Milgrom’s theory explains the same facts “without contrivance”. Following Worrall, I 
would argue that Laudan’s objection does not apply in such cases: that is: that the suc-
cessful Milgromian prediction of A trumps any post-hoc, standard-model accommodation 
of A via parameter adjustment. 
In some formulations of his rule, Feyerabend placed a stronger condition on the pre-
dictions entailed by T′ (called A in the above). For instance, in his (1965) he wrote (p. 
176; note that M is used here in place of A, and C in place of F): 
assume that a theory T has a consequence C and that the actual state of af-
fairs in the world is correctly described by C’, where C and C′ are experi-
mentally indistinguishable. Assume furthermore that C′, but not C, triggers, 
or causes, a macroscopic process M that can be observed very easily and is 
perhaps well known. … What is needed in order to discover the limitations 
of T implied by the existence of M is another theory, T’, which implies C′, 
connects C′ with M, can be independently confirmed, and promises to be a 
satisfactory substitute for T where this theory can still be said to be correct. 
Exactly what Feyerabend meant here by “triggers, or causes” is not obvious. John Worrall 
(1991, p. 346) writes: “Now, according to Feyerabend, C′ “triggers” M. I suppose this 
means that the state of affairs described by C′ causes (via the operation of natural laws) 
the process M.” (Feyerabend, in response, was not very helpful: “Worral has difficulties 
with `triggers’: any dictionary will tell him what the word means.” )  4
I would suggest an alternate reading to Worrall’s. It would be reasonable to argue that 
some novel predictions of T’ are more relevant than others in the (effective) refutation of 
T. For instance, to the extent that the postulates comprising T′ are independently testable, 
it is possible that the same postulate(s) of T′ that entail C′ might also entail M. Whereas 
novel predictions of T′ that are logically unconnected from C′ (if such exist) could rea-
sonably be considered less relevant in the refutation of T.  
Feyerabend often emphasized that theories in the early stages of development are less 
widely applicable than the theories they are meant to eventually replace; for instance in 
Against Method he writes: 
Theories which effect the overthrow of a comprehensive and well-en-
trenched point of view, and take over after its demise, are initially restricted 
to a fairly narrow domain of facts, to a series of paradigmatic phenomena 
which lend them support, and they are only slowly extended to other areas. 
… Later on, of course, the theory is extended to other domains; but the 
mode of extension is only rarely determined by the elements that constitute 
the content of its predecessors (Feyerabend 1978, p. 176). 
Such a state of affairs would be difficult to reconcile with the statement in his (1964a) 
version of the rule that “we introduce another theory T' … which covers the facts sup-
porting T.” It would seem more reasonable to reformulate this as:  “we introduce another 
 Feyerabend (1987, p. 293). The misspelling of Worrall’s name is Feyerabend’s.4
theory T' … which covers the facts supporting T, in whatever domain both theories are 
deemed capable of making valid predictions given their respective stages of 
development.” And indeed, in some formulations of his rule, Feyerabend inserted lan-
guage that appears to be consistent with this interpretation; for instance in his (1964b, pp. 
306-307) he begins the statement of his rule as follows (italics added): 
Consider a theory T which makes predictions P in a domain D, and assume 
also that the actual state of affairs P' is different from P but to such a small 
extent that the difference is far below the experimental possibilities. 
In what follows I will assume that when Feyerabend requires T'  to “cover the facts sup-
porting T,” he intends that statement to apply only to facts that lie in whatever domain(s) 
both theories are expected to be valid.  This qualification (or clarification) is important, 
since there is no consensus yet on the proper, relativistically-invariant version of Mil-
grom’s theory.  Both Milgromian and standard-model researchers do claim, however, that 5
their theories are applicable to galaxies and to groups of galaxies, in regimes of density 
and velocity where relativistic corrections are not important (e.g. Famaey & McGaugh 
2012).  
3 Example no. 1: direct detection of dark matter
The standard cosmological model accounts for discrepancies in the rotation of disk gal-
axies by postulating additional gravitational force from unseen matter. The dark matter is 
assumed to have whatever spatial distribution is required to reconcile the observed mo-
tions with the gravitational force from the observed (non-dark) mass, assuming the cor-
rectness of Newton’s laws of gravity and motion.  This postulate of the standard model 6
has been formulated in various ways; for instance, Milgrom (1989, p. 216) writes  “The 
DMH [dark matter hypothesis] simply states that dark matter is present in whatever quan-
tities and space distribution is needed to explain away whichever mass discrepancy aris-
es.” Henceforth I will refer to this postulate of the standard cosmological model as the 
DMH. Note that the DMH can be used to generate predictions only about individual, ob-
served galaxies, and only about the dark matter in those galaxies; it implies nothing about 
 Nevertheless there do exist relativistic versions of Milgrom’s theory that are, apparently, as successful as 5
the standard model at explaining data from the cosmic microwave background, the matter power spec-
trum on cosmological scales etc. See Angus (2009) and Skordis & Złosnik (2020) for two examples. 
 Even some normal matter is expected to be `dark’; for instance, the black hole and neutron star remnants 6
that are believed to be produced during the late evolution of massive stars. Astrophysicists (both standard-
model and Milgromian) typically try to account for the presence of these objects when computing the 
gravitational force from the normal matter.
the properties of the normal matter, or about (for instance) the large-scale distribution of 
dark matter, the behavior of dark matter in the early universe etc. The standard cosmolog-
ical model does contain additional postulates that are relevant to such questions but those 
postulates are logically and empirically independent of the DMH, and they do not enter 
in any way into the predictions that are tested via the direct-detection experiments 
described in this section. 
In the case of the Milky Way galaxy, the density of dark matter required to reproduce 
the measured rotation curve given the observed distribution of normal matter (stars, gas 
dust), under simple assumptions about the dark-matter distribution (e.g. that it is smooth 
and spherically symmetric), is approximately 0.011 M⦿ pc-3 ≈ 1.0 x 10-24 g cm-3 near the 
Sun (Iocco, Pato & Bertone 2015). Assuming in addition (as standard-model cosmolo-
gists routinely do) that the dark matter is distributed macroscopically in a steady-state 
manner implies a local velocity dispersion of the dark particles of approximately 270 km 
s-1. `Dark’ is typically taken to mean `not interacting with photons’ (e.g. Weinberg 2008, 
p. 186). No known particle is believed capable of constituting the dark matter (Tanabashi 
et al. 2018). 
A prediction of the standard cosmological model is therefore that P1: dark particles 
are passing through any Earth-based laboratory, with a mass density of ∼10-24 g cm-3 and 
a velocity dispersion of ~270 km s-1 . Experimental tests of P1 are called direct-detection 
experiments (Cerdeño & Green 2010; Marrodán Undagoitia & Rauch 2016) and about a 
half-dozen are currently underway  (e.g. Kisslinger & Das 2019); some of these are up-
dated or improved versions of experiments that have been ongoing since as early as the 
1980s. There is intersubjective agreement that no event has yet been observed that can 
reasonably be interpreted as the signal of a dark particle passing through a laboratory de-
tector (Liu et al. 2017; Ko 2018; Schumann 2019).  
The failure to detect the particles constitutes a prima facie anomaly for the standard 
cosmological model, just as the occurrence of Brownian motion presented a prima facie 
anomaly for phenomenological thermodynamics. One way to describe the problem is to 
say that existing experimental results are consistent both with P1, and with P1′, its nega-
tion. 
Application of Feyerabend’s rule requires that “P′ is different from P but to such a 
small extent that the difference is far below the experimental possibilities.” There are two 
ways to demonstrate that Feyerabend’s requirement is satisfied here. First: regardless of 
how senstive or discriminating the detectors become (the current generation of detectors 
are about 107 times more sensitive than those of the 1980s), failure to detect a signal will 
always be consistent both with the presence and absence of dark particles, since nothing 
is known (aside from experimentally-determined upper limits) about the interaction cross 
section of the particles with the normal matter in the detectors (e.g. Schumann 2019). 
Second: a consensus has emerged that the limits of detectability set by the `neutrino floor’ 
will soon be reached: neutrinos are believed to be abundant, there is no way to shield the 
detectors against them, and they could induce nuclear recoils in a detector that would be 
difficult or impossible to distinguish from those caused by dark-matter particles (Verga-
dos & Ejiri 2008; Billard et al. 2014). Hence (many experimenters acknowledge) the like-
lihood of a detection is becoming very small even if the dark particles exist. 
Milgrom’s theory (theory T′ in Feyerabend’s rule) does not postulate the existence of 
dark matter. The anomalous rotation of galaxies that is addressed in the standard model 
via the DMH, is explained in Milgrom’s theory by assuming a modification to Newton’s 
laws of gravity and motion (Milgrom 1983). Thus Milgrom’s theory explains, in a natural 
way, the experimental anomaly: the lack of any experimental detection of dark particles. 
To satisfy the additional requirements set by Feyerabend for alternate theory  T′, we need 
to identify confirmed, novel consequences of the theory; and following the discussion in 
the previous section, we would prefer that those consequences derive from the same pos-
tulates that correctly predict galaxy rotation, that is, the same postulates that remove the 
need for dark matter in galaxies like the Milky Way. 
Milgrom (1983) postulates a relation different from Newton’s between gravitational 
force and acceleration, for accelerations less than about a0 ≈10-8 cm s-2, where a0 (`Mil-
grom’s constant’) is assumed to be a universal constant. In the asymptotic regime, i.e. a 
<< a0, Milgrom’s modified dynamics predict that galaxy rotation curves will be `flat’, 
that is, that the rotation speed V will be independent of R, the distance from the galaxy’s 
center. Asymptotic flatness of rotation curves was a well-established fact already by 1980 
and Milgrom has acknowledged (Milgrom 1983) that he designed his postulates to yield 
this result. But the same postulates that explain asymptotic rotation-curve flatness turn 
out to have a great deal of additional, testable content. Using the modified dynamics, one 
can predict the full rotation curve of any disk galaxy given the observed distribution of 
normal matter alone: both in the low- and high-acceleration regimes (Milgrom 1988; 
Brada & Milgrom 1995; Begeman, Broeils & Sanders 1991). Such predictions have been 
confirmed for dozens of disk galaxies of all sub-types; most remarkably, for galaxies that 
(according to a standard-model cosmologist) are `dark-matter dominated’, that is, for 
which the observed rotation speed greatly exceeds the predictions of Newton at all radii 
(McGaugh & de Blok 1998). 
 A number of additional predictions are entailed by the same postulates that correctly 
account for rotation curves without dark matter. A functional relation is predicted, and has 
been observationally confirmed, between the asymptotic rotation speed and the total mass 
(normal, not dark) of a galaxy: the so-called `baryonic Tully-Fisher relation’ (Lelli et al. 
2016a). Milgrom’s theory also successfully predicts a universal relation between the cen-
tral surface density of a disk galaxy and the surface density that a standard-model cos-
mologist would assign to the dark matter in that galaxy (Lelli et al. 2016b).  
Thus the remaining conditions set by Feyerabend are amply satisfied in this case: 
Milgrom’s theory  “covers the facts supporting T” and “makes successful additional pre-
dictions” within the domain where both theories are considered to be valid. Feyerabend’s 
rule would therefore direct us to interpret the failure of the direct-detection experiments 
as (indirect) proof that the dark particles are not present. 
Suppose we stop here for a moment and play devil’s advocate. How do the two theo-
ries fare if we imagine reversing their order when applying Feyerabend’s rule? Would the 
asymmetry that we have seen so far—Milgrom’s theory favored, the standard model dis-
favored—survive the reversal, or might we find that the standard model can also `win’ 
according to Feyerabend’s criteria? 
Thus: theory T is now Milgrom’s, which predicts that P, i.e. that no dark particles ex-
ist. And here we notice the asymmetry already: because from the standpoint of Milgrom’s 
theory, there is no experimental anomaly; the lack of any laboratory detection is now the 
expected outcome.  
Continuing doggedly ahead, we next define as theory T′ the standard cosmological 
model, which predicts that P′ , i.e. that dark particles are present. We are assuming, of 
course, that P′ is true. Now if we are going to claim that P′ , like P, is consistent with the 
experimental results (no detections), we might want to include an additional hypothesis in 
T′ that explains this fact.  (No such additional hypothesis was required when Milgrom’s 
theory played the role of T′ .) And as noted above, standard-model cosmologists do not 
shrink from doing precisely this: for instance, by postulating arbitrarily small interaction 
cross sections. So we might want to re-define T′ as the standard model plus an auxiliary 
hypothesis, something like `The interaction cross section of the dark particles with nor-
mal matter is so small that no detections are expected.’ 
Feyerabend next directs us to show that T′ explains the other facts successfully ex-
plained by T. And here the asymmetry is dramatic: because T′  explains nothing that is 
successfully explained by T . No standard-model algorithm exists that can predict an  ob-
served galaxy’s rotation curve. The same is true with regard to the requirement that  T′ 
have corroborated excess content compared with T : both the dark matter postulate DMH, 
and the auxiliary hypothesis about interaction cross sections (if we choose to include it), 
are ad hoc manœuvres; both instruct the scientist to adjust the assumed properties 
(macroscopic or microscopic, respectively) of the dark matter as needed to maintain con-
sistency with whatever data are available. 
 
4 Example no. 2: primordial dwarf galaxies
Standard-model cosmologists have devoted considerable effort to understanding how gal-
axies like the Milky Way might evolve to their currently observed states, starting from 
some postulated initial conditions describing the dark matter, and including auxiliary hy-
potheses that describe the behavior of the normal matter (Longair 2008; Mo, van den 
Bosch & White 2010). While predictions that follow from such simulations can only be 
statistical in nature, some of the simulation results are robust enough that they can be 
used, with greater or lesser certainty, to generate testable predictions about single galactic 
systems. One often-discussed example is the prediction (Klypin et al. 1999; Moore et al. 
1999) that much (∼20% − 50%) of the dark matter surrounding a galaxy like the Milky 
Way should not be smoothly distributed: rather it should be clumped into bound `sub-ha-
los’, and the sub-halos should be distributed according to a mass hierarchy that is statisti-
cally well-determined by the simulations: roughly speaking, N(m) ∝  m-1.9, with m the 
mass of a single clump (Springel et al. 2008). Furthermore the spatial distribution of the 
sub-halos about the host galaxy should be approximately spherically symmetric and their 
velocity distribution should be approximately isotropic, that is, exhibiting little if any or-
dered motion (Pawlowski et al. 2014). In the case of a galaxy with the mass of the Milky 
Way, the number of such clumps is predicted to be quite large: about 500 with (dark) 
masses above 107 M⦿ (Zavala & Frenk 2020). The mass of the largest such clump is not 
robustly predicted by the simulations but is estimated to be of order 1010 M⦿ for a galaxy 
similar in size to the Milky Way (Boylan-Kolchin et al. 2010). For comparison, the mass 
(in stars and gas) of the Milky Way disk is about 1011 M⦿. 
The Milky Way (like many other, nearby galaxies) is known to be surrounded by a 
contingent of dwarf satellite galaxies: most famously the two `Magellanic Clouds’ that 
are visible to the naked eye, but surveys have identified a few dozen of lesser mass (that 
is: lower luminosity), some as small as a few hundred solar luminosities (e.g. Drlica-
Wagner et al. 2015). Since the 1990s, standard-model cosmologists have routinely identi-
fied these satellite galaxies with the dark-matter sub-halos in their simulations.  For in7 -
stance, Willman (2010, pp. 1-2) writes  
The intrinsically faintest dwarfs (which can only be found and studied close 
to the Milky Way) likely inhabit the least massive dark matter halos that 
can host stars. Such dwarfs may thus provide the most direct measurement 
of the mass spectrum, spatial distribution, and clustering scale of dark mat-
ter.  
The hypothesis here is that the stars of the observed satellites were formed out of gas that 
condensed in the gravitational potential wells of the dark sub-halos. This hypothesis is 
consistent (from a standard-model perspective) with the observed internal motions of the 
dwarf galaxies, which (as in the case of spiral galaxy disks) require dark matter in order 
to be reconciled with Newton’s laws. 
The postulated identification of the observed satellite galaxies with the sub-halos in 
the simulations is vulnerable to observational tests. I will focus on two standard-model 
predictions that appear, at least on the surface, to conflict with the observations. The first 
anomaly is similar to the direct-detection anomaly discussed above: it is the failure of so-
 Indeed there is growing momentum, on the part of standard-model cosmologists, to define `galaxy,’ 7
quite generally, as `a stellar system containing dark matter’; see Willman & Strader (2012).
called `indirect detection’ experiments to detect radiation from the sub-halos due to self-
annihilation of dark matter particles. The second anomaly, called by standard-model cos-
mologists the `missing-satellites problem’, is the fact that the observed number of Milky 
Way satellite galaxies is far smaller than the predicted number of dark-matter clumps. I 
will argue that both failures of prediction satisfy Feyerabend’s condition: they are poten-
tially falsifying instances, but the falsifications are difficult or impossible to demonstrate. 
Indirect-detection experiments (e.g. Funk 2015) are based on the idea that dark-matter 
particles might sponaneously undergo reactions that result in photons or other standard-
model particles, e.g. neutrinos, that could be detected even from great distances. One 
class of postulated reactions are the self-annihilations which have the form 𝞆 + 𝞆 → (𝜸, 𝝂, 
…) , that is, the dark particles (𝞆) act as their own anti-particles, yielding photons (𝜸) and 
neutrinos (𝝂) among other possible products. Spontaneous decays of the dark particles 
might also occur. Photons produced via such reactions would be expected to have gam-
ma-ray energies and could be detected by existing gamma-ray observatories, either on the 
ground or in space (e.g. Porter, Johnson & Graham 2011). Among the many experimental 
challenges is the difficulty of distinguishing any detected photons from those produced 
by known astrophysical sources, e.g. pulsars, in the targeted galaxies (Buckley et al. 
2013; Strigari 2018).  
There is intersubjective agreement that no signal has yet been detected that can con-
vincingly be interpreted as evidence for a dark matter sub-halo (Gaskins 2016; Conrad, 
Cohen-Tanugib & Strigari 2018; Rinchiuso et al. 2019). Most experiments have (quite 
reasonably) been `targeted’ searches, that is, the telescopes have been directed toward 
known satellite galaxies, particulary those nearest the Earth. Untargeted searches (e.g. 
Glawion et al. 2019) could, in principle, detect sub-halos where there is no known satel-
lite galaxy but such searches are much more time-consuming. 
As in the case of the direct-detection experiments, the results are consistent both with 
the presence and the absence of the sub-halos. The reason is that the self-annihilation 
cross section, or decay lifetime, of the dark particles is unknown, and a failure to detect a 
signal can always be `explained away’ by postulating small cross-sections or long life-
times.   8
 Standard-model cosmologists sometimes invoke, in this context, the so-called `WIMP miracle’: the fact 8
that the self-annihilation cross-section needed to obtain the correct cosmological abundance of dark mat-
ter via thermal production in the early universe is similar to what is expected for a new particle (a 
`WIMP’) that interacts via the electroweak force. However there is an emerging consensus that this par-
adigm for dark matter has already been experimentally ruled out (e.g. Siegel 2019). Karl van Bibber, in 
the Summary talk of the July 2016 Identification of Dark Matter (IDM2016) meeting in Sheffield, Eng-
land, encouraged the experimenters in his audience not to be discouraged: “No hand-wringing over fray-
ing of the `WIMP miracle’! … Often a deceptively too simple argument is just what’s required to get the 
ball rolling.”
Consider next the missing-satellites problem.  There is intersubjective agreement that 9
the observed satellites of the Milky Way can account for only a small fraction of the pre-
dicted sub-halos in the relevant mass ranges; e.g. Silk & Mamon (2012, p. 939): “The ex-
cessive predicted numbers of dwarf galaxies are one of the most cited problems with 
ΛCDM. The discrepancy amounts to two orders of magnitude.” Stated differently: the 
vast majority of the sub-halos would need to contain few if any stars to avoid being ob-
served as dwarf galaxies. There is no shortage of auxiliary hypotheses that have been 
proposed to explain the anomaly (e.g. Simon 2019); for instance, the infalling gas could 
have been heated by the first generation of stars, causing the gas to be removed and star 
formation to cease. But no single mechanism `works' across the full spectrum of satellite 
galaxy (that is, sub-halo) masses, and standard-model cosmologists routinely invoke dif-
ferent mechanisms, as the need arises, to explain the data on different mass scales. For 
instance, Bullock (2010, p. 12), after listing the various mechanisms that have been pro-
posed for suppressing star formation in the sub-halos, remarks: “each imposes a different 
mass scale of relevance … If, for example, we found evidence for very low-mass dwarf 
galaxies … these would be excellent candidates for primordial H2 [molecular hydrogen] 
cooling `fossils' of reionization in the halo.” Indeed, standard-model researchers often 
simply assume whatever mapping of dark mass to stellar mass (the `stellar mass-halo 
mass’ relation) is required to reconcile their dark-matter simulations with the observed 
population of dwarf galaxies (e.g. Jethwa, Erkal & Belokurov 2018). 
The attitude of standard-model cosmologists toward the missing-satellites problem is 
similar to the attitude, described by Feyerabend (1947/1967), of scientists toward 
Eherenhaft’s experiments on electron charge. Feyerabend writes (appendix 2, p. 5) that 
when confronted with Ehrenhaft’s seemingly anomalous results, scientists  
occasionally acted almost as some of Galileo's opponents must have acted 
when confronted with the telescope. They pointed out that no conclusions 
could be drawn from them as they were the result of the interaction of many 
complex phenomena. In short, they were Dreckeffekt.  
In the case of the primordial dwarf galaxy hypothesis, the “many complex phenomena” 
are the many physical processes invoked for suppressing star formation in the sub-halos. 
The alternative theory is, once again, Milgrom’s. Milgromian researchers postulate a 
different formation mechanism for the satellite galaxies, one that does not invoke the ex-
istence of dark matter and which (as we will see) implies a number of testable and (from 
a standard-model perspective) extremely improbable consequences. The argument goes 
as follows (Kroupa 2014): 
There is a formation mechanism that is well-established for dwarf galaxies like the 
satellites of the Milky Way: it is the removal, via tidal forces, of clumps of stars or gas 
 Milgromian researchers prefer the name `dwarf over-prediction problem.’9
from the disks of spiral galaxies. Observations of interacting galaxies (e.g. Mirabel, Dot-
tori & Lutz 1992; Weilbacher et al. 2000; Lee-Waddell et al. 2016) leave little doubt that 
this occurs, and this conclusion is reinforced by high-resolution simulation studies (e.g. 
Bournaud et al. 2008; Bílek et al. 2019). Thus, there is intersubjective agreement, among 
both Milgromian and standard-model researchers, that `tidal dwarf galaxies’ (TDGs) exist 
around many spiral galaxies. 
There may exist other dwarf-galaxy formation mechanisms. But from the standpoint 
of a Milgromian theorist, one mechanism that definitely can not exist is the one postulat-
ed by standard-model cosmologists for the Milky Way satellites: that is, formation inside 
of dark-matter sub-halos. Stated differently: In a Milgromian cosmology, `primordial 
dwarf galaxies’ (PDGs) do not exist. It follows that some, and perhaps all, of the Milky 
Way satellites are TDGs.  As in the standard cosmological model, there is no definite pre-
diction of the expected number of satellites, but the observed population sizes (around the 
Milky Way and some other nearby galaxies) are consistent with expectations based on 
simulations of tidally-interacting galaxies (Okazaki & Taniguchi 2000; López-Corredoira 
& Kroupa 2016). Thus, both of the experimental anomalies discussed in this section—the 
`missing satellites,’ and the failure to detect radiation from the dark sub-halos—are natu-
rally explained under Milgrom’s theory. 
Feyerabend’s second condition states that the alternate hypothesis must successfully 
predict novel facts, and this requirement is satisfied as well (Kroupa 2012; 2014). TDGs 
in interacting galaxies are observed to fall along `tidal tails’: streams of material that (ap-
parently) have been pulled out of one galaxy’s disk during the interaction. Conservation 
of angular momentum implies that after the close encounter, the TDGs will continue to 
move in correlated orbits around their host galaxy—that is: they should be found to lie in 
approximately planar or toroidal structures, with most or all members orbiting in the 
same sense. And indeed, it has been known since the 1970s that almost all of the brighter 
Milky Way satellites lie in a stream that aligns (on the plane of the sky) with the two 
largest satellites, the Magellanic clouds.  Observations since the 1970s have added to the 10
number of known satellites and have also yielded information about the line-of-sight dis-
tances and space velocities of many of them. The results (as reviewed by Pawlowski 
2018) are remarkable: The vast majority of the Milky Way satellites appear to lie on or 
near the same plane defined by the orbits of the two Magellanic Clouds. This `vast polar 
structure’ (VPOS) is a 200 kpc diameter torus with a thickness-to-diameter ratio of ~0.2, 
and an orientation that is nearly perpendicular to that of the Milky Way’s disk (hence the 
`polar’ in VPOS). The Magellanic Stream, a narrow structure of stars and gas emanating 
from the Magellanic Clouds, is also part of the VPOS as are a number of other, gaseous 
and stellar streams. Obtaining orbital velocities of the satellites is challenging, however it 
 This remarkable fact—established already in the 1970s (Lynden-Bell 1976; Kunkel & Demers 1976)—10
was all but ignored by standard-model cosmologists until quite recently, in spite of (or perhaps because 
of) the fact that it is so clearly at odds with the predicted distribution of dark sub-halos. 
has been shown that at least eight of the satellites are orbiting in the same sense around 
the Milky Way while one is counter-orbiting.  11
Furthermore the Milky Way satellite system is not unique in displaying a remarkable 
degree of coherence. About one-half of the satellite galaxies belonging to the Milky 
Way’s giant companion galaxy, M31 (the `Andromeda Galaxy’), also define a planar 
structure (Ibata et al. 2013); remarkably, the plane so defined passes very nearly through 
the Milky Way, a fact that has motivated formation models for the two planar structures 
that invoke a past interaction between the two galaxies (e.g. Bílek et al. 2018).  Other, 
nearby galaxies show evidence for similar structures (Tully et al. 2015; Müller et al. 
2018). That these observations are unexpected is attested by the fact that standard-model 
cosmologists have not yet come up with any, even remotely plausible, way to reconcile 
the observed correlations with their dark-matter simulations (Pawlowski 2018). 
If all dwarf galaxies are TDGs, a natural expectation (Kroupa 2012) is that all of the 
satellites should define a homogenous set in terms of observable properties (compostion, 
structure, internal dynamics etc.) or relations between those properties. And indeed, this 
appears to be the case (e.g. Collins et al. 2015). Such homogeneity would be quite unnat-
ural if some satellites were TDGs and some PDGs, given the very different postulated 
modes of formation. 
In view of these successful predictions of the alternate theory, I conclude that Feyer-
abend’s criterion directs us to interpret the failure to detect either annihilation radiation 
from sub-halos, or the `missing satellites’ that are postulated to inhabit them, as effective 
refutations of the standard model in favor of Milgrom’s theory. 
5 Example no. 3: dynamical friction
Standard-model postulate DMH instructs the researcher to distribute dark matter in or 
around a galaxy, as needed, to accommodate the available kinematical data, under the as-
sumption that Newton’s laws are valid. Since the motions of stars and gas clouds in ob-
served galaxies always respect (as near as one can tell) Milgrom’s modified dynamics, 
and not Newton’s, this means that dark matter is used, by the standard-model cosmolo-
gist, as a sort of `MOND-emulator’: an ad hoc device to augment the gravitational force 
and render the observed kinematics consistent with Milgrom’s laws of motion. One con-
sequence is that the trajectory of a test-body around a galaxy will be roughly the same 
whether predicted by a standard-model or a Milgromian cosmologist, since the body 
`sees’ approximately the same effective potential in either case. 
However there are terms in the equations of motion that are different in the two theo-
ries. Particle dark matter behaves (by assumption) as a collisionless fluid, and so a mas-
 The fact that the satellites lie spatially in a thin planar structure already implies a great deal of velocity 11
correlation, unless one postulates that we are observing the structure at a special time.
sive body  moving through it would experience dynamical friction: a gradual transfer of 12
energy from the directed motion of the body to the random motion of the background. 
The rate of deceleration is proportional both to the mass, M, of the body and to the (mass) 
density, 𝝆, of the background, i.e. dV/dt ∝ −M𝝆F(V) with F(V) a function of the body’s 
velocity (e.g. Merritt 2013, chapter 5). If the massive body is orbiting around some larger 
system, dynamical friction will cause the orbit to decay, in much the same way that the 
orbit of an artificial satellite decays due to friction with the Earth’s atmosphere.  
In the absence of dark matter, predicted timescales for orbital decay of the Milky Way 
satellites would be very long. But if galaxies are embedded in dark-matter halos, orbital 
decay times can be orders of magnitude shorter, for two reasons: the mass M of the satel-
lite is increased due to its dark halo, and the density 𝝆 of the background is also increased 
by a similar factor due to the dark halo surrounding the Milky Way. Thus, the same satel-
lite galaxy that would experience little frictional force under Milgromian dynamics, could 
experience rapid orbital decay according to standard-model assumptions. 
In fact, straightforward calculations suggest that orbital decay times for the more mas-
sive Milky Way satellites should be much less than 1010 yr under the standard model 
(Kroupa 2015). As an example, the Sagittarius  dwarf galaxy has a mass in stars of about 13
108 M⦿ and its current distance from the center of the Milky Way is about 16 kpc 
(Gómez-Flechoso, Fux & Martinet 1999). Standard-model cosmologists would predict a 
dark mass of about 1010 M⦿ for a galaxy with this stellar mass (Ferrero et al. 2012). If the 
Sagittarius dwarf started out on a circular orbit of radius 50 kpc—well out in the Milky 
Way’s dark halo—and with a dark mass of 1010 M⦿, the dynamical friction timescale (the 
time for the orbit to shrink by a factor of two, say) would be only about 3 Gyr, much 
shorter than the age of the Galaxy.  
Thus a prediction of the standard cosmological model is that the orbits of (at least) the 
brighter Milky Way satellite galaxies should have decayed substantially over the lifetime 
of the Galaxy. Consistent with this prediction is the possibility that the orbits of some, 
pre-existing satellite galaxies have shrunk so much that the satellites have already merged 
with the disk or bulge of the Milky Way and disappeared from view. 
The potentially falsifying observation here would be demonstration of the absence of 
the effects of dynamical friction. A measurement of the instantaneous rate of energy loss 
of an orbiting body would be decisive, but (much as in the Brownian motion problem) 
that rate is far too small to be determined observationally. A tractable, but somewhat 
model-dependent, alternative consists of carrying out backward time-integrations of a 
 “Massive” means here that the mass of the body is much greater than the mass of a single dark-matter 12
particle, i.e. M ≫ m𝛘 .
 Dwarf galaxies are traditionally named after the constellation in which they sit. This naming scheme 13
has become cumbersome as the number of identified dwarves has increased, e. g. Bootes I, Bootes II, 
Bootes III etc.
satellite’s trajectory to test whether its current orbit can plausibly be seen as the end result 
of decay starting from reasonable initial conditions (e.g. Laporte et al. 2018). But Angus 
et al. (2011) find that reconciling the current orbits of the brighter Milky Way satellites 
with the effects of dynamical friction always requires finely-tuned or improbable initial 
conditions. 
Other examples exist. There is a group of galaxies similar in size and composition to 
the Local Group and that is located about 3.6 Mpc from the Sun: the so-called M81 
group, an assemblage of about three dozen galaxies surrounding the giant spiral M81. 
There is intersubjective agreement (based on observed tidal features and on the distribu-
tion of gas) that the brighter galaxies in the group have experienced close interactions in 
the recent past (e.g. Yun, Ho & Lo 1994). But modeling of the system under standard-
model assumptions suggests that the brighter galaxies would merge, due to dynamical 
friction, in a time not much longer than the time required for a single encounter, unless 
the initial conditions are highly contrived. Oehm et al. (2017, p. 273) write: 
Long living, non-merging initial constellations that allow multiple galaxy–
galaxy encounters comprise unbound galaxies only, which are arriving from 
a far distance and happen to simultaneously encounter each other within the 
recent 500 Myr.  
The lack of unambiguous evidence of the predicted effects of dynamical friction satis-
fies Feyerabend’s condition: it is a potentially falsifying circumstance, but the falsifica-
tion is difficult or impossible to establish, due to the long associated timescales and to 
uncertainties about initial conditions. 
Milgrom’s theory naturally explains why the effects of dynamical friction should not 
be observed. One reason, of course, is that under the modified dynamics, the presence of 
dark matter is not needed to explain the internal kinematics either of giant galaxies like 
the Milky Way and M81, or of dwarf systems like the Sagittarius satellite galaxy, and so 
dynamical friction timescales are predicted to be much longer.  Another factor, relevant to 
orbital decay of the Milky Way satellites, is the different formation mechanism of the 
dwarf galaxies under Milgrom’s theory: the dwarves are not assumed to be primordial, 
and so they would only have been present as distinct systems since the tidal encounter 
that produced them, thus shortening the time available for their orbits to decay (Angus et 
al. 2011). 
Feyerabend’s final condition, of corroborated excess content, is also satisfied for Mil-
grom’s theory, as documented in the previous two sections. 
6 Discussion
There are two reasons why a scientist might be interested in a criterion like Feyerabend’s 
as it relates to the dark-matter problem. First, Feyerabend’s rule applies to situations that 
are normally not considered when tallying up the successes or failures of a given theory: 
namely, instances in which the implications of an experimental result with regard to a 
given theory are ambiguous. Second, as discussed briefly above, the two cosmological 
theories under discussion here come close to satisifying the condition of empirical equiv-
alence: both provide (according to their adherents) successful explanations of a wide va-
riety of observational data, hence one would like to have a criterion other than empirical 
success for deciding between them. Feyerabend’s rule provides such a criterion. 
The three examples discussed here are not the only standard-model tests to which 
Feyerabend’s rule can be applied. For instance, attempts by standard-model cosmologists 
to explain galaxy rotation curves (that is, to explain why every type of galaxy should 
have just the `right’ distribution of dark matter to mimic Milgromian dynamics) have re-
peatedly failed, but those failures have generally not been interpreted as falsifications, 
since one can always argue (for instance) that the computer simulations have not properly 
accounted for the behavior of the normal (non-dark) matter (Silk & Mamon 2012; Bul-
lock & Boylan-Kolchin 2017). As Feyerabend might have said, anomalies of this sort, 
like the existence of Brownian motion, can always be explained away as “Dreckeffekte”, 
as the “interaction of many complex phenomena,” rather than as refuting instances. 
Whereas Milgrom’s theory finds no anomaly in rotation curves—that is, it explains those 
data naturally—and it does so while simultaneously presenting the observer with a raft of 
additional, testable, and (in many cases) verified predictions, thus satisfying all of Feyer-
abend’s requirements for the preferred theory T′. 
There is an underlying reason why Feyerabend’s rule finds such broad application in 
the context of cosmology. The standard cosmological model is not well suited to making 
testable predictions. As in the case of rotation curves, its predictions concerning normal 
matter almost always depend in a complicated and often poorly-specified way on the past 
behavior of both normal and dark matter. Whereas Milgrom’s theory—the `alternate’ the-
ory—is able to make genuinely testable predictions about the normal matter, predictions 
that are completely independent of the details of galaxy formation and evolution. Fur-
thermore, those predictions often turn out to be correct. 
Although Feyerabend formulated his rule in a number of slightly different ways, a 
common element was the requirement of (increased) testability of the alternate, that is, 
the preferred, theory. It was Feyerabend’s commitment to the importance of testability—
that is, to (the growth of) empirical content—that motivated his argument that refuting 
instances could sometimes be identified only with the help of an alternate theory, and, 
therefore, that theoretical pluralism was essential for the progress of science: 
Both the relevance and the refuting character of decisive facts can be estab-
lished only with the help of other theories … Hence the invention of alter-
natives to the view at the centre of discussion constitutes an essential part 
of the empirical method (Feyerabend 1978, p. 41). 
But one need not accept Feyerabend’s entire argument here in order to recognize the 
more basic implication of his methodological rule: that when given a choice between two 
hypotheses that are both consistent with a given, ambiguous, experimental result, one 
should prefer the hypothesis that has a greater degree of testability, and which has been 
shown to survive (at least some) tests. This is, of course, a thoroughly Popperian view of 
progress , and even critics of Feyerabend’s broad generalizations can be supportive of 14
this more limited interpretation of his rule.  15
In his discussions of Brownian motion and observer dependence, Feyerabend was 
considering cases for which, at the time of his writing, the scientific community had al-
ready reached a consensus about which of two competing theories provided the correct 
explanation. In the new examples discussed here, no such consensus has yet been 
reached. At the same time, it is probably fair to say that the standard cosmological model 
is overwhelmingly the more favored of the two theories, at least in the eyes of the scien-
tific and educational communities taken as a whole. And so it is all the more interesting 
that Feyerabend’s rule instructs us to prefer Milgrom’s theory over the standard model. 
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